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I. INTRODUCTION
New safety risks often emerge after drugs have been approved and are in wide clinical
use.1 This situation was highlighted recently by the unanticipated cardiovascular risks of
Cox-2 drugs,2  the risk of suicide for children and adolescents taking antidepressants,3 the
risks of rhabdomyolysis and kidney failure with cholesterol-lowering drugs,4  and risks for
women taking hormone replacement therapy.5 A number of changes to the system for
controlling drug safety in the United States either have been implemented or currently are
being discussed. These include the recent creation of an independent Drug Safety Over-
sight Board within the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA);6  proposals to enhance
FDA’s existing postmarket activities;7 collaborative risk-management approaches involv-
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1
 Alastair J.J. Wood, C. Michael Stein & Raymond Woosley, Making Medicines Safer—The Need
for an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 N. ENG. J. MED. 1851 (1998).
2
 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Food and Drug Admin. (FDA), Transcripts
of Joint Meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Comm. and the Drug Safety and Risk Management
Advisory Comm. (Feb. 16-18, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cder05.html
[hereinafter FDA, Joint Meeting Transcripts].
3
 CDER, FDA, Labeling Change Request Letter for Antidepressant Medications (as updated Oct.
28, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIlabelChange.htm.
4
 FDA, Detailed View: Safety Labeling Changes Approved by FDA Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (Sept. 2003), http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2003/sep03.htm; CDER, FDA,
FDA Public Health Advisory on Crestor (rosuvastatin) (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/drug/advisory/crestor_3_2005.htm.
5
 FDA, FDA News: FDA Updates Hormone Therapy Information for Post Menopausal Women
(Feb. 10, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEW01022.html.
6
 FDA, FDA Fact Sheet: FDA Improvements in Drug Safety Monitoring (Feb. 15, 2005), http://
www.fda.gov/oc/factsheets/drugsafety.html.
7
 FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. Thomas
Fleming, Professor & Chairman, Dep’t of Biostatistics, Univ. of Washington), available at http://
help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_03_01/fleming.pdf; id. statement of William B. Schulz, Partner,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_03_01/schultz.pdf; En-
suring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Dr. Bruce Psaty,
Univ. of Washington), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_03_03/psaty.pdf [herein-
after Hearing on Drug Safety].
VOL. 6146 FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL
ing FDA, the pharmaceutical industry, and physicians;8  and other proposed drug safety
oversight activities either within, or independent of, FDA.9
This public dialogue has tended to focus on FDA and its activities, rather than
looking beyond FDA at the broader legal framework for drug safety, which also may
need reform and modernization. FDA plays a crucial role in drug safety, but the agency’s
powers are limited by the U.S. Constitution; by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA);10 and by FDA’s own regulations. Other players also are important. “Fix-
ing” FDA may not fix the problem, therefore, without related changes to the overall
framework in which the agency operates.
This article argues that the current drug safety framework lacks tools that are essen-
tial for selective risk management. Here, “selective” refers to an approach that seeks to
manage and minimize risk, while still preserving the therapeutic benefits that risky prod-
ucts may offer to patients. This implies controlling drug-related injuries, whenever pos-
sible, by means other than simply keeping products off the market. An example of this
approach would be to improve the targeting of therapies by screening patients to deter-
mine the right drug and dose for each individual and to identify patients with a height-
ened susceptibility to injury. Targeting requires a level of scientific understanding that
still is unavailable for many drugs, although this science is developing rapidly. Another
option would be to improve clinical drug safety compliance (i.e., making sure that known
safety information is communicated effectively and put into practice). Still another op-
tion would be rapid detection and response when adverse reactions do occur, in order to
lessen the resulting injuries.
Implementing a system of selective risk management would require scientific and
technical work, and it also would require fundamental legal reforms. Addressing the
technical issues is partly a question of resources. Developing data, techniques, and
active surveillance systems to monitor and manage drug-related risks is costly. Promis-
ing efforts, such as those by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
and Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics (CERTs), have suffered under
funding constraints.11 Assuming the technical challenges can be overcome, there are
fundamental problems with the way current U.S. laws and regulations approach risk
management.
This was clear in February 2005 when an FDA advisory panel reviewed safety con-
cerns with three popular Cox-2 painkillers, but ultimately voted to allow all three drugs to
continue being sold.12 What was troubling about this situation was that it displayed
how few options FDA has available for managing drug safety problems. The advisory
panel was faced with a stark, binary choice with potential casualties on either side.
Patients who had come to rely on these drugs would suffer if they ceased to be avail-
8
 Hearing on Drug Safety, supra note 7, statement of Dr. Cecil B. Wilson, American Medical
Ass’n Board of Trustees, available at http://help.senate.gov/testimony/t208_tes.html; see also FDA,
TASK FORCE ON RISK MANAGEMENT, MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE (1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/Tableofcontents.htm.
9
 Wood et al., supra note 1; Psaty Statement, supra note 7; see also Hearing on Drug Safety,
supra note 7, statement of Dr. Raymond Woosley, Critical Path Inst., Univ. of Arizona, available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_03_03/woosley.pdf.
10
 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399).
11
 See, e.g., AHRQ, Budget Limitation on AHRQ Large Research and Conference Grant Applica-
tions (Notice NOT-HS-04-007) (Aug. 5, 2004), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-
HS-04-007.html; AHRQ, Special Emphasis Notice: Research Priorities for the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (Notice NOT-HS-05-005) (Nov. 30, 2004), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/
notice-files/NOT-HS-05-005.html.
12
 FDA, Joint Meeting Transcripts, supra note 2.
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able,13 but continued sales of the drugs would harm patients who are susceptible to
drug-related injuries. In these situations, FDA ultimately is reduced to flipping an “on/
off” switch—to allow sale or not—and safety regulation is reactive. Regulators can
react to the risk/benefit ratio, but they have little power to change the ratio by selec-
tively reducing the risks.
This problem has historical origins. Many nations, including the United States, rely
on drug regulations that were designed in the mid-twentieth century. Premarket review
of drug safety in the United States dates back to passage of the FDCA in 1938, which
was amended in 1951 to distinguish between prescription and over-the-counter drugs,14
and again in 1962 to require premarket review of drug efficacy, as well as safety.15  In that
era, there was little understanding of why some people respond well to a drug while
others respond adversely or not at all. Drugs, therefore, fell into the legal category of
“unavoidably unsafe” products—products that provide benefits, but which, in the
present state of human knowledge, cannot be made perfectly safe in their intended
uses.16  Science and information technology did not support targeting of therapies or
large-scale, real-time monitoring and analysis of clinical data. This limited the opportu-
nities for selective risk management and the concept remained poorly developed in drug
safety regulations. Preventing the sale of a drug became the primary regulatory tool for
managing its risks—a strategy that avoids risk by sacrificing the drug’s benefits.
Despite incremental modernization in recent years, today’s drug safety regulations
bear a lasting imprint of these earlier constraints. Until fundamental modernization takes
place, FDA and its advisory committees will face harsh, unpleasant choices and the public
will be denied the full measure of safety and therapeutic benefit that current technologies
could support. By analogy, there are two ways to design a regulatory framework to pre-
vent fire-related injuries. The first is to empower a regulator to approve, or disapprove, the
sale of matches and other products that can start fires. The second is to allow these
products to be sold, but implement forceful systems to manage their risks. These systems
could include, for example, promoting research into fire-retardant technologies, establish-
ing fire departments to respond promptly when fires do occur, and implementing programs
to make sure that available safety warnings are understood and observed. The current
drug safety regulatory framework remains heavily invested in the first strategy and
underinvested in the second one, which exemplifies selective risk management.
II. BARRIERS TO SELECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT
The United States will continue to face ongoing problems with drug safety until the
government addresses three items of business that still are unfinished, almost seventy
years after passage of the FDCA: 1) ensuring compliance with important safety warn-
ings while preserving needed flexibility for physicians to adapt drug use to the indi-
vidual patient; 2) developing a clearer distinction between pre- and postapproval safety
regulation; and 3) devising mechanisms to promote adequate investment in safety im-
provements.
13
 John Leland, Pain Pills Withdrawn, Many Renew Search for Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005.
14
 Durham-Humphrey Act, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951).
15
 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
16
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1977); Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation:
Construction and Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 2[a] (1998,
updated through 2004); Sheryl Calabro, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine:
Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2250 (2004).
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A. Promoting Compliance With Safety Warnings
Safe clinical use of drugs requires not only that standards of safe use be identified,
but also that they be heeded and put into practice. A large-scale study found that
labeling revisions and efforts to communicate contraindications of the drug cisapride
(PropulsidTM) had little real impact on prescribing behavior.17  Manufacturers ultimately
removed cisapride, terfenadine (SeldaneTM), and astemizole (HismanalTM) from the mar-
ket because of noncompliance with warnings, stated in each drug’s labeling, that pre-
scribing the drug in combination with certain other drugs (e.g., erythromycin) could
cause life-threatening arrhythmias.18  Troglitazone (RezulinTM), bromfenac (DuracetTM),
and trovafloxacin (TrovanTM) were removed from the open market due to noncompliance
with labeling provisions aimed at managing liver toxicity, although the drugs, if used as
directed in the labeling, were considered safe.19  Numerous studies have found patients
suffer injuries because drugs are prescribed, dosed, taken, or monitored inappropriately,
often in direct contravention of safety warnings contained in their labeling.20
If failure to heed a drug’s labeling results in injuries, FDA’s principal recourse is to
remove the drug from the market, either by withdrawing approval or, more commonly,
through pressures that induce voluntary removal of the drug by the manufacturer.21  As
discussed infra, FDA does not have the power to require that a drug stay on the market
so that its benefits are preserved, but to enforce compliance with the drug’s labeling
provisions. FDA’s accelerated approval program22  envisions nuanced safety manage-
ment through special restrictions on use23  but, again, provides no direct enforcement of
the use restrictions—only withdrawal of the drug in the event of noncompliance.24  This
17
 W. Smalley, D. Shatin, D.K. Wysowski, J. Gurwitz, S.E. Andrade, M. Goodman, K.A. Chan,
R. Platt, S.D. Schech & W.A. Ray, Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food and Drug
Administration Regulatory Action, 284 JAMA 3036 (2000).
18
 Raymond L. Woosley & Glenn Rice, A New System for Moving Drugs to the Market, ISSUES SCI.
& TECH. ONLINE (Winter 2005), http://www.issues.org/issues/21.2/woosley.html.
19
 Id.
20
 See, e.g., N. Barber, M. Rawlins & B. Dean Franklin, Reducing Prescribing Error: Compe-
tence, Control, and Culture, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 29 (2003); Jerry H. Gurwitz & Paula
Rochon, Improving the Quality of Medication Use in Elderly Patients: A Not-So-Simple Prescription,
162 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1670 (2002); Timothy S. Lesar, Tenfold Medication Dose Prescribing Errors,
36 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1833 (2002); Anne Bobb, Kristine Gleason, Marla Husch, Joe Feinglass,
Paul R. Yarnold & Gary A. Noskin, The Epidemiology of Prescribing Errors: The Potential Impact of
Computerized Prescriber Order Entry, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 785 (2004); Eran Kozer, Dennis
Scolnik, Alison Macpherson, Tara Keays, Kevin Shi, Tracy Luk & Koren Gideon, Variables Associ-
ated With Medication Errors in Pediatric Emergency Medicine, 110 PEDIATRICS 737 (2002); Lars Noah,
The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’ Genetic Profiles, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2002); see also INST. OF MED., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, TO ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 27-43 (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson
eds., 2000) (discussing medication errors generally, including noncompliance with warnings and other
types such as errors due to equipment failure or inaccurate diagnosis) [hereinafter IOM, TO ERR IS
HUMAN].
21
 Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Patterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS 178 (David G. Adams,
Richard M. Cooper & Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 1999); see also I. Scott Bass, Enforcement Powers of
the Food and Drug Administration: Drugs and Devices, id. at 70-74.
22
 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (HHS), FDA, New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug
Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval (Final Rule amending 21 C.F.R. Parts 314 and 601), 57
Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992).
23
 HHS, FDA, New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval (Proposed Rule amending 21 C.F.R. Parts 314 and 601), 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,237 (Apr.
15, 1992).
24
 21 C.F.R. § 314.530.
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is not to say that FDA necessarily should have the power to enforce physician compli-
ance with the safety information provided in a drug’s labeling, but merely to point out
that, without this power, it is difficult for FDA to manage a drug’s risks while still
preserving its benefits.
Selective risk management still would be possible, even in this situation, if there were
a workable compliance framework outside FDA (e.g., through state regulation, the tort
system, or voluntary efforts of the medical profession and healthcare industry). It then
would be possible for FDA to continue to allow sale of the drug, while relying on
external mechanisms to ensure compliance with important safety warnings related to the
drug’s use. As discussed infra, there is not, at present, a dependable compliance frame-
work that FDA can rely on for this purpose. The absence of such a framework hinders
selective risk management, sometimes to the point that a beneficial therapy is lost even
though the drug could be safe if used in accordance with its labeling.
The fact that FDA cannot enforce physician compliance with a drug’s labeling re-
flects a conscious division of authority under the FDCA for functions that might be
described as standard setting and clinical compliance. FDA is involved in setting safety
standards but does not enforce day-to-day physician compliance with them.
1. Standard Setting
There is not a formal, comprehensive list of “FDA safety standards” for each drug
that FDA approves. Rather, standards are expressed indirectly through the drug’s label-
ing and through other conditions FDA establishes for the manufacture, distribution,
sale, and use of the drug. FDA-approved labeling provides instructions for safe use and
discloses known risks, contraindications, and warnings.25  Under FDA’s accelerated
approval program, the agency can impose special restrictions on distribution and use to
address safety concerns.26  As new risks arise, FDA can work with manufacturers to
revise drug labeling, can require boxed warnings or warning letters to physicians, and
can issue warnings to the public.27  Collectively, these actions establish a de facto set of
safety standards—a body of information, instructions, warnings, and conditions that
FDA, based on the scientific evidence available to the agency, has deemed to be impor-
tant for the safe use of a particular drug.
2. Clinical Compliance
Clinical compliance involves efforts to foster adherence to known safety standards
and to deter high-risk prescribing practices. Direct federal or state regulatory enforce-
ment is one option, but it has long been regarded warily. There are sound reasons to
preserve significant discretion for physicians to weigh a drug’s risks and benefits on a
patient-by-patient basis and to prescribe drugs in ways not always consistent with their
labeling. Labeling provisions are based largely on data from clinical trials, which do not
necessarily capture the full range of health conditions and patient characteristics that
physicians face in day-to-day practice.28  Lack of data proving that a particular use is
25
 21 C.F.R. § 201.55-.57; see generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 201, subpt. A (General Labeling Provisions)
and subpt. B (Labeling Requirements for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin).
26
 Id. § 314.520.
27
 Id. § 201.57(e); see also FDA, The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting
Program, Medical Product Safety Information, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2005).
28
 Woosley & Rice, supra note 18.
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safe does not amount to proof that the use is unsafe. Off-label use of drugs (i.e., pre-
scribing drugs for medical indications, to patient subgroups, or in ways that clinical
trials and labeling did not envision) often does produce a therapeutic benefit, which
could be lost if there were rigid enforcement of drug labeling.
Alternative compliance mechanisms include, for example, drug-injury lawsuits, to the
extent these lawsuits have a deterrent effect on high-risk prescribing practices; volun-
tary compliance efforts within the medical profession and healthcare and pharmaceuti-
cal industries; and technical “fixes,” such as automated prescription order-entry sys-
tems that remind physicians of warnings at the time the prescriptions are written. A
compliance mechanism not now in general use would be to require patients’ informed
consent for uses of drugs that directly contravene important safety provisions in the
labeling of those drugs. This would promote physicians’ awareness of the warnings
that they are recommending be ignored, and it could reduce high-risk prescribing by
giving patients an opportunity to opt out of the treatment.
Improving clinical drug safety requires, first, a clear understanding of where the
problems lie. Are there problems with standard-setting, clinical compliance, or both?
Because FDA is not heavily involved in clinical compliance, reforms that focus strictly
on the agency may leave compliance issues unresolved. For example, one of the reforms
proposed after the recent Cox-2 safety problems was to grant FDA greater power to
require postapproval labeling revisions.29  It is not clear, however, that additional tweak-
ing of labeling can make drugs safe, when the safety standards reflected in drug labeling
are widely disregarded.30  Selective risk management involves both standard setting and
compliance and, thus, may require reforms on both fronts.
Under the FDCA, responsibility for clinical compliance was left mainly to the states.
There was a spirited legislative debate in the late 1930s, before passage of the FDCA,
concerning the proper scope of state and federal power in this sensitive area of health
policy.31  States traditionally had regulated the practice of medicine and offered redress,
through lawsuits, for medical malpractice and product-related injuries. Congress made
clear that by passing the FDCA, it did not intend to authorize broad FDA regulation of
the practice of medicine.32  Courts have not found constitutional limits on FDA’s power
to regulate physicians,33  but the agency, as a matter of policy, has sought to avoid direct
regulation of their activities.34  FDA has stated “labeling is not intended either to pre-
clude the physician from using his best judgment in the interest of his patient, or to
impose liability if he does not follow the package insert.”35  FDA decides whether a drug
can be sold and approves its labeling, but does not enforce the safety standards re-
flected in the approved labeling.
29
 CNN, FDA Wants to Dictate Warning Labels (Mar. 1, 2005) (copy on file with authors); Aaron
Levin, FDA Officials Divided Over Need for Policy Change, 40(7) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1 (2005); Press
Release, Office of Senator Chris Dodd, Grassley, Dodd Expand Effort to Improve Drug Safety System
(Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://dodd.senate.gov/press/Releases/05/0427.htm.
30
 Smalley et al., supra note 17; Amy Barrett, Tough Warning Labels, Weak Results, BUS. WK.,
Apr. 13, 2005, available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7488711/.
31
 Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 21, at 17-24.
32
 Dep’t of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), FDA, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for
Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration (Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503-05 (July 30, 1972).
33
 David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care Profession-
als, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 21, at 423.
34
 Id. at 425-26; see also 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,503-04.
35
 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,504; William L. Christopher, Off-label Drug Prescription: Filling the
Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247 n.6 (1993).
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After passage of the FDCA, states could develop individual approaches for promoting
physician compliance with the safety standards that flow out of FDA’s regulatory pro-
cess. Direct state regulatory enforcement was one possibility; it would have meant em-
powering state regulatory agencies to oversee physician compliance with drug labeling.
As matters evolved after 1938, however, the states did not embrace this approach. Many
state medical boards do monitor prescribing practices, but usually this is aimed at specific
problems, such as over-prescribing of narcotic painkillers and other controlled substances,
rather than at policing compliance with safety provisions in drug labeling.36
Instead, lawsuits in state courts became an important de facto compliance mecha-
nism at the state level.37  The tort system serves several purposes, including compensa-
tion of injured parties, deterrence of behaviors that contribute to injuries, and corrective
justice.38  The deterrence aspect of tort litigation is what makes it a compliance mecha-
nism: The threat of financial liability for drug-related injuries creates incentives for
manufacturers to make their products safe and to provide accurate warnings, and it
encourages physicians to heed known safety information.
When the FDCA was passed in 1938, it may have seemed plausible that the state tort
system could provide an effective, albeit indirect, compliance mechanism. Privity-of-
contract requirements traditionally had prevented consumers from suing product manu-
facturers with whom they had not dealt directly, as typically is the case with drug
manufacturers. Such suits were becoming more common, however, by the 1930s.39  Fac-
ing a real threat of such suits, drug manufacturers, it seemed, would have strong incen-
tives to see that their products were prescribed in a safe manner.40
A 1948 New York court decision41  weakened these incentives for manufacturers. Its
approach later came to be known as the learned intermediary doctrine,42  and some form
of this doctrine eventually was adopted by all fifty states.43  The doctrine transfers key
duties related to clinical drug safety from manufacturers to physicians, on the premise
that the physician’s prescribing decision ultimately controls the risks to which a patient
is exposed.44  In many states, listing a risk in the drug’s labeling is sufficient to shift
liability to the physician, even if the physician never actually read the warning.45  Manu-
facturers still can be sued for risks that they failed to disclose in drug labeling, such as
the recently discovered cardiovascular risks with Cox-2 drugs, but the learned interme-
diary doctrine tends to shield manufacturers from liability for disclosed risks. This
encourages manufacturers to pack labeling with long and often indigestible lists of even
small safety problems. It may not encourage them, however, to make sure the safety
36
 Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of Physician
Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 21 (2003).
37
 Troyen A. Brennan & Marilynn Rosenthal, Medical Malpractice Reform: The Current Pro-
posals, 10 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 212 (1995).
38
 See GUIDO CALBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24-33 (1970); DON N.
DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS
SERIOUSLY 5-9 (1996).
39
 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see also Mason v. Am.
Emery Steel Works, 241 F.2d. 906 (1957), citing 49 HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1936).
40
 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing incentives created by tort
litigation); Andrew Barrett, The Past and Future of Comment k: Section (4)(B)(4) of the Tentative
Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts—Is It the Beginning of a New Era for Prescription Drugs?, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1291, 1298-303 (1995).
41
 Marcus v. Specific Pharm., 77 N.Y.S.2d. 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
42
 Sterling Drug v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
43
 Calabro, supra note 16, at 2248.
44
 Kane, supra note 16, §§ 1[a], 2[a].
45
 Id. §§ 21-23.
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warnings are effectively communicated and put into practice, because the mere pres-
ence of the warning tends to shift liability to physicians.
The shift of liability would seem to provide strong incentives for physicians to heed
safety warnings. In practice, however, lawsuits have not functioned ideally as a clinical
compliance mechanism. One reason is that courts apply medical malpractice rules, rather
than product liability law, when physicians are sued for drug-related injuries.46  Malprac-
tice rules measure a physician’s duty relative to a professional standard47  (What do
other physicians do?) rather than to an objective standard (What really is reasonable, in
light of the facts?) or a regulatory standard (What does FDA deem safe?). Ignoring
safety warnings may carry no negative financial consequence for the physician, if
disregard is so widespread as to become the professional standard. This weakens the
deterrent effect of tort litigation. Some states do treat labeling and package inserts as the
standard of care, but many states treat it as just one factor to consider.48
Another problem is that malpractice suits do not provide a clear, consistent link
between prescribing practices and financial consequences. Empirical studies have found
that fewer than two percent of negligent medical injuries actually result in a malpractice
claim.49  Conversely, a study of 3,500 malpractice claims found that only seventeen
percent actually involved a negligent injury.50  Unsafe prescribing practices may go
unpunished even as prudent ones draw large penalties. The tort system provides a
“fragmented and capricious response” to injuries.51  Effective deterrence requires preci-
sion: those claims—and only those claims—that involve a negligent injury should be
compensated.52  Lacking this precision, drug-injury lawsuits are not a strong compli-
ance mechanism.53
The United States has an incomplete legal framework for drug safety. This may come
as a surprise, given how often it is characterized as comprehensive or even overbearing.
The government and industry expend great effort to develop drug safety standards, but
the system lacks dependable means to promote day-to-day compliance with the stan-
dards. FDA does not directly enforce safe prescribing practices; there is little direct
regulatory enforcement at the state level; state tort lawsuits, at best, provide a spotty
set of incentives for compliance; and much depends on voluntary efforts. Taken as a
whole, the current legal framework is not toothless, but it only has one big tooth: to
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remove products from the market (or to threaten to do so). As a result, postapproval
drug safety regulation is binary and reactive, and risks often can be managed only at the
cost of benefits.
B. Distinguishing Pre- and Postapproval Standard Setting
Selective risk management also calls for modernization of the regulatory standard-
setting process. In particular, it requires a clearer distinction between pre- and
postapproval drug safety regulation and the safety standards needed at each phase.
Current FDA regulations impose various new inspection, monitoring, and reporting
requirements54 —some only voluntary55 —that come into effect after a drug is approved.
However, there is little real change in FDA’s decisional power, in the scope of its jurisdic-
tion, or in the concept of drug safety itself, following drug approval. FDA’s postapproval
decision authority, in many respects, is limited to affirming or reversing its own prior
decisions, using the same types of data and methodologies that then were relevant. An
earlier-granted approval can be withdrawn, for example.
Rethinking past decisions may not be the best way to manage uncertainties inherent
in the future. Factors that bear on what is safe, for purposes of justifying an initial drug
approval, are not necessarily the same factors that determine whether a drug will be
safe in actual clinical use. FDA’s postmarket monitoring and reporting emphasize col-
lection of data that would have been relevant during premarket approval (e.g., adverse
events related to drug use),56  rather than creation of new information specifically rel-
evant to safe clinical use (e.g., data explaining why some people react badly, data iden-
tifying ways to spot those people before drugs are administered, and data identifying
the best procedures to detect and mitigate the harms that do occur).
Risks known at the time of approval must be disclosed in labeling,57  but are tolerated
in the following sense: If an approved drug produces adverse events that were identi-
fied during pre-approval clinical trials, and which occur at roughly the same frequency
that the trials predicted, the manufacturer generally is not required to take steps to
reduce the rate at which those adverse events occur. Much of the effort of postapproval
regulation instead is dedicated to detecting and reporting new risks as they are discov-
ered. Thus, FDA calls for immediate reporting, in fifteen days, of new risks, (i.e., adverse
drug experiences that are both serious and unexpected).58  Other adverse experiences,
including expected ones, are reported periodically,59  but these data are not used in a
systematic goal-setting process to reduce their frequency. Moreover, it is estimated that
data reported to FDA cover only one to ten percent of all adverse events that actually
occur, and between one third and one half of all the serious adverse events.60  Current
regulations tolerate a level of “unavoidable” risk that may be increasingly avoidable
in the future, as the science of selective risk management improves.
This, again, reflects historical factors. Mid-twentieth century information technol-
ogy could not support large-scale, continuous, real-time monitoring of data from actual
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clinical use of approved drugs. As a result, regulations did not conceive standard
setting as an ongoing, real-time adaptive process that continuously incorporates les-
sons from today’s clinical experience to refine the management of risks tomorrow. As
technology has improved, so have opportunities for risk management. To take advan-
tage of this, regulations would need to re-conceive what safety standards are.
In addition to FDA’s existing standard-setting activities (e.g., review of drug label-
ing), there is a need for postapproval standards that specifically address the challenge
of making drugs as safe as possible when and as they actually are prescribed.
Postapproval safety standards might include, for example, standards for when and how
patients should be screened to assess their susceptibility to drug-related injury; moni-
toring procedures to ensure prompt detection of certain types of serious drug reactions;
recordkeeping procedures to ensure the monitoring takes place; and best treatment
protocols to mitigate harms that are experienced by patients. Developing these stan-
dards would require new data that go beyond what FDA currently collects.
The task would require expanded access to outcomes data and other clinical informa-
tion, as well as data from laboratory studies of biomarkers (e.g., data explaining indi-
vidual variations in drug response). Developing and using these data to establish
postapproval safety standards would require efforts both within and outside FDA.
Some states already have efforts underway to develop statewide clinical information
systems61  and electronic medical records to help identify, study, and prevent adverse
drug reactions. State and federal coordination would be needed to ensure system
interoperability and consistent privacy protections, and to resolve how to finance fur-
ther work on these systems.
The funding of laboratory studies also presents challenges. Much of the research
needed for selective risk management is basic science rather than product-specific
research, and manufacturers may be unwilling to shoulder the cost of this additional
research. For example, genetic research to support better targeting of one drug may
produce information relevant to other drugs, creating a free-rider problem as manufac-
turers wait for others to take the lead. Federal funding agencies such as the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) may need to provide leadership, both in setting priorities and
in providing funding. NIH traditionally has played a major role in funding the basic
upstream scientific research that precedes drug development. Selective risk manage-
ment implies a corresponding need for basic downstream research—basic science to
improve clinical safety after drugs are developed and approved. Funding for this re-
search, at present, is severely limited.
As the necessary data become available, there is the question of how best to harness
the data into useful postapproval safety standards. Along with FDA, AHRQ and CERTs
could play important roles in an expanded standard-setting effort, if adequate funding
mechanisms are put in place.
C. Funding the Costs of Improved Clinical Safety
One of the greatest challenges in improving drug safety is to promote investment in
incremental safety efforts, such as postapproval drug safety studies, clinical data gath-
ering and surveillance, safety education, and development of postapproval safety stan-
dards. A major defect of the current U.S. drug safety framework is the lack of workable
financing mechanisms for these safety efforts. Resolving the financing problem may
require statutory amendments and other broad legal reforms.
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The United States, as discussed supra, relies heavily on state tort lawsuits as a
clinical compliance mechanism. By design, the tort system compensates prior victims; it
is not a cost-sharing mechanism to gather funds for prospective investment in safety-
related projects. This is a more serious failing today than it was in the mid-twentieth
century, when the United States first came to rely heavily on lawsuits to address drug-
related injuries. In coming years, pharmacogenomics and other risk-management tech-
nologies may offer real prospects to improving drug safety, but only if there is adequate
investment in these technologies. Rather than simply compensating victims for “un-
avoidable” injuries, today’s compliance system needs to gather funds to invest in projects
that gradually will make drug-related injuries more avoidable; lawsuits, by design, do
not serve this latter objective. Printed labeling, for example, is a 1938 technology, and
studies suggest that drug safety could be improved through computerized prescription
order-entry systems that alert physicians to warnings and contraindications at the time
prescriptions are written.62  Lawsuits cannot finance an improvement of this type; they
merely compensate the harms that result, if the improvement is not made.
The FDCA and FDA’s regulations do not adequately address the funding problem.
FDA has significant power to promote clinical drug safety through the regulation of
drug manufacturers, even without directly regulating the physicians, providers, and
pharmacists. In theory, drug manufacturers could serve as a fulcrum to promote drug
safety compliance throughout the industry (e.g., FDA could enlist manufacturers to
monitor how their drugs actually are being prescribed and to provide remedial training
to address unsafe prescribing practices). In reality, however, there are problems with
this approach. There are statutory limits on FDA’s power to order manufacturers to
make safety improvements, but—even when that is not a problem—there are practical
limits. Specifically, drug manufacturers have no legal duty to continue selling an ap-
proved drug that is known to help people, if doing so would be unprofitable. The
pharmaceutical industry is not subject to the service obligations seen in many other
regulated industries (e.g., public utilities), where suppliers, once they offer a service and
induce public reliance on it, cannot stop offering it without regulatory approval to do
so.63  In those industries, suppliers cannot simply cease operations to avoid the cost of
making consumers safe. Drug manufacturers, in contrast, have the option of withdraw-
ing a drug as an alternative to incurring costs to address its safety problems.
There are sound policy reasons for not imposing general service obligations on drug
manufacturers. Industries operating under these obligations usually are ones—such as
electric power transmission—where price regulation provides regulated companies with
a reasonable guarantee of cost recovery, which is not the case with pharmaceuticals.
FDA traditionally has been sensitive to the fact that drug manufacturers operate in a
competitive environment where the long-term availability of new drugs depends on
sound industry economics. This and other concerns—such as whether a drug manufac-
turer could be exempted from product liability if it were selling a drug against its own
preference—make service obligations problematic. When the accelerated approval pro-
gram was debated in 1992, public comments sought a service obligation to protect
patients who were benefiting from drugs that later had to be withdrawn due to side
effects in other subpopulations. FDA rejected the suggestion.64
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The lack of a service obligation hinders selective risk management, because drugs
can be withdrawn to avoid the cost of managing their risks. The solution does not lie in
imposing service obligations; rather, it lies in developing better mechanisms to finance
postapproval safety measures. FDA lacks the power, under current statutes and regula-
tions, to require parties other than the manufacturer to help bear the costs of improving
drug safety. This situation arguably is unjust, because parties other than the manufac-
turer do share the benefits of drug safety improvements. Private health insurers and
governmental payers may experience reduced claims for drug-related injuries; providers
and physicians may enjoy reduced malpractice liability; and adverse-responding pa-
tients, if they could be identified in advance, might avoid harm by not purchasing the
drug. With no way to elicit contributions from these other parties, there often is no
practical way for FDA to fix safety problems while still preserving a pipeline of commer-
cially available drugs.
Currently, FDA must proceed cautiously in the knowledge that imposing additional
safety requirements, even in an earnest attempt to save a drug that benefits responding
patients, may destroy the drug’s profitability thus making it just as unavailable as a
regulatory nonapproval would have done. This caution can be seen in FDA’s approach
to postmarket studies. Traditionally, FDA lacked a clear statutory mandate to require
postmarket studies of drug products,65 although the agency claimed that it could require
such studies as part of FDA’s general powers to enforce the FDCA and to require drug
companies to provide data bearing on whether previously granted approvals should be
withdrawn.66 FDA did not apply this power aggressively and across-the-board, how-
ever, as a tool to develop new data for postapproval risk management.
The 1992 accelerated approval program clearly authorized FDA to require postmarket
studies of effectiveness (to confirm the relation of surrogate endpoints to actual clinical
benefits),67  but not of safety. In response to industry concerns, FDA declined to require
timely completion of the postmarket studies by a specific date, and recent data show
that completion rates, in fact, have been poor.68 FDA also offered assurances that
postmarket studies would be required only in narrowly defined circumstances, usually
involving completion of a test already underway at the time of approval and in no event
going beyond what usually is required in premarket clinical trials.69 Under a self-im-
posed limit not to go beyond premarket data gathering, how can FDA optimize the safe
clinical use of drugs? As already discussed, pre- and postmarket safety regulations
require entirely different types of data.
The problem, then, is not simply whether FDA has the actual authority to order safety
improvements, but that the agency lacks a way to spread the costs fairly among all of the
parties that stand to benefit from increased drug safety. FDA’s statutory authority could
be expanded to allow the agency to collect fees for clinical safety measures from parties
other than the drug manufacturer, and then apply these funds to safety-related projects.
This approach, however, would embroil FDA in contentious issues of economic regula-
tion for which it has neither the staffing nor experience, given its traditional role as a
scientific regulator. Moreover, a centralized regulatory financing mechanism of this sort
would be complex to administer, given the sheer size of the U.S. pharmaceutical and
healthcare industries.
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In summary, the tort system, by its nature, does not gather funds to invest in future safety
improvements. FDA presently does not have the authority to implement a broad cost-
sharing mechanism for this purpose. Even if the agency did have the authority, a centralized
regulatory cost-sharing framework raises practical concerns. The problem of funding
postapproval safety measures has never been satisfactorily resolved. Selective risk manage-
ment will require better financing and cost-sharing mechanisms than exist today.
III. DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
A simple test of any reform proposal is how well it addresses the three challenges just
identified: 1) promoting clinical compliance with known safety information while pre-
serving the valid role of physicians’ discretion; 2) developing an adaptive process to set
standards for the safe use of approved drugs, based on lessons learned in actual clinical
practice; and 3) promoting investment in clinical safety improvements. This section
focuses on the first and third of these challenges and the legal reforms that may be
needed to address them.
The second challenge—postapproval standard setting—in many respects is a scien-
tific and technical challenge, which involves identifying the current best practices for
using drugs safely in the clinic while actively managing their risks, and developing the
necessary data and information systems to support this process. These databases and
information systems present various legal issues (e.g., informed consent and privacy
protection). Arguably, though, the greatest barrier to postapproval standard setting is
not whether today’s technology can support it, or whether the ancillary legal issues can
be resolved, but how to pay for it. Thus, addressing the third challenge is key to the
second. The two crucial legal reform challenges are to develop workable compliance
and funding mechanisms.
Reforms that focus entirely on FDA—even if they envision a significant expansion
of the agency’s statutory authority—cannot fully address these challenges. Concern-
ing clinical compliance, there are good reasons not to make FDA a direct federal enforcer
of safe prescribing practices. This was true when the FDCA was being debated in the
1930s, and it remains true today. Promoting safe clinical use of drugs possibly is too
complex a task to be done in a centralized, top-down way, especially by an agency that
is as compactly staffed as FDA, relative to staffing levels at other major federal agen-
cies. FDA would face ongoing jurisdictional clashes with state medical boards and
could face objections from patient advocacy groups and others wishing to preserve
discretion for physicians to recommend off-label uses—including uses that, in indi-
vidual cases, may run counter to known safety warnings. Moreover, there are inherent
conflicts of interest in having a single agency set and enforce safety standards. FDA is
not the logical locus of reforms to improve clinical compliance and, as already noted, an
FDA-administered financing mechanism may not offer a practical solution to the fund-
ing problem. These challenges call for broader reforms.
A. Reforming Elements of the Existing Safety Framework
The broader drug safety framework, of which FDA is one part, includes other federal
and state agencies, courts, and nongovernmental activities. Reforms could enhance, for
example, the role of state regulators, the role of drug-injury tort litigation, and the role of
voluntary efforts to promote drug safety. This section examines prospects for address-
ing the compliance and funding challenges through these existing elements of the drug
safety framework.
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The original vision of the FDCA was that states would have primary responsibility
for clinical compliance to the extent it is a medical practice issue. State regulators could
increase their direct oversight of physician prescribing practices as a way to improve
drug safety. This approach raises many of the same concerns already noted in connec-
tion with FDA enforcement. Direct regulatory enforcement, whether state or federal,
may unduly limit physicians’ discretion and sacrifice potential therapeutic benefits as-
sociated with off-label use of drugs. Moreover, clinical safety requires the combined
efforts of many parties including, among others, physicians, other healthcare providers,
manufacturers, insurers, and advertisers and their regulators.70  States may lack jurisdic-
tion to involve all of these parties. Additional compliance efforts at the state level may
be part of the solution, but appear insufficient on their own.
With regard to the funding problem, a state regulator would face many of the same
issues FDA would face in implementing a centralized regulatory cost-sharing mecha-
nism, and jurisdictional issues may narrow the pool of parties from which a state could
gather funds. This does not appear promising as a comprehensive solution. Moreover,
state efforts to gather and apply funds would need to be coordinated at a national level
in order to set overall priorities and to ensure common technical standards.
The opposite extreme from direct regulatory enforcement would be to rely primarily
on voluntary compliance efforts. Voluntary efforts can play, and in some instances
already are playing, an important role in improving drug safety, while avoiding the
problem of unduly limiting physicians’ discretion. Unfortunately, voluntary measures,
to date, have not provided the dependable clinical compliance framework and levels of
investment needed to support selective risk management.
Because lawsuits are an important de facto compliance mechanism, tort reform is
another possible approach to improve clinical compliance. Such reforms would need to
strengthen incentives both for physicians to follow safe prescribing practices and for
manufacturers to promote safe use of their drugs. These tort reforms differ from the
“conventional” malpractice reforms that many states have pursued since the 1980s,71
which generally focus on reducing the number of claims, eliminating frivolous suits, or
placing caps on noneconomic damages.
One way to enhance physicians’ incentives would be for state legislatures to adopt
a standard of care that requires a physician to adhere to the safety provisions included
in a drug’s labeling, unless the physician documents why adherence is not in the patient’s
best interest. This approach still would allow physicians to exercise discretion, but
would require them to exercise it deliberately. Alternatively, states could provide an
informed-consent tort remedy for patients who were not informed that a safety warning
was being ignored. This approach, too, would preserve discretion for physicians to
disregard safety warnings, subject to informed consent. Another, and possibly more
controversial, approach would be to enact federal legislation that preempts the existing
hodge-podge of state liability standards and allocates responsibilities for clinical drug
safety more clearly among manufacturers, providers, physicians, pharmacists, and other
concerned parties.
Strengthening manufacturers’ incentives may require adjustments to the learned in-
termediary doctrine, which shifts much of the responsibility for clinical drug safety from
manufacturers to physicians. One possible approach is to require manufacturers to
“earn” protection under the learned intermediary doctrine on a case-by-case basis, by
showing that the individual company has taken steps to promote safe use of the drug
that generated the lawsuit.72  Such steps might include, for example, basing sales repre-
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sentatives’ commissions on how well, rather than how often, drugs are prescribed—an
approach that reportedly already is in use by one manufacturer.73  Other steps could
include postmarket studies, tracking of actual prescribing practices, and safety educa-
tion efforts to ensure that physicians understand and heed important safety warnings.
Even if done well, tort reform leaves some basic issues unresolved. The threat of
lawsuits provides only an indirect incentive for prospective safety improvements74  and
it can have the perverse effect of undercutting drug safety. The fear of lawsuits may
reduce incentives for manufacturers to acquire better information about the risks of
drug products already in use.75  Manufacturers that make an extra effort to monitor
clinical outcomes and conduct postmarket research to identify drug safety problems are
not immune from then having the results of these efforts turned against them in court.76
Paradoxically, the threat of lawsuits also may cause manufacturers to leave dangerous
products on the market longer than they should, fearing that recall would be seen as an
admission that the product harms patients and thus invite a flood of litigation.77  Blame-
based systems work against transparency and frank disclosure, which actually may be
the keys to fixing safety problems.78
If the United States continues to rely heavily on lawsuits as a mechanism to promote
safe clinical use of drugs, it may not be possible to resolve today’s drug safety prob-
lems. The tort system, as noted supra, produces only a spotty correspondence between
actions and consequences, which is incompatible with selective risk management. Meet-
ing the two key challenges—clinical compliance and funding of future safety invest-
ments—ultimately may require replacing, rather than reforming, the role of tort litigation
in the overall U.S. framework for drug safety.
B. An Insurance-Based Alternative to Drug-Injury Lawsuits
An insurance-based framework for drug-injury compensation may offer advantages
in meeting these challenges. There have been various proposals to adopt a no-fault
system for managing medical risks;79  this approach would supplant malpractice suits
with an insurance-based system to compensate iatrogenic injuries.80  The United States
is unlikely ever to replace its medical malpractice system in toto. However, these con-
cepts merit consideration for the subset of physician malpractice suits that involve
drug-related injuries and for product liability suits against drug manufacturers.
An insurance-based system is not an untested concept. Pharmaceutical injury insur-
ance pools have operated in Sweden since 197881  and Finland since 1984,82  and an
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insurance framework has been proposed as a way to address blood-product injuries in
Canada.83  The United States implemented a no-fault National Vaccine Injury Compensa-
tion Program (NVIC) in the 1980s for certain categories of vaccine-related injuries.84  In
other areas, insurance-based frameworks have replaced tort claims to compensate pol-
lution-related injuries in Japan and accident-related and medical injuries in New Zealand.85
These programs are similar to workers’ compensation schemes adopted by all fifty U.S.
states in the 1910s and 1920s, insofar as injured persons give up the right to bring
ordinary lawsuits in return for swifter, more consistent compensation through a special
administrative claims process that is funded by payment of insurance premiums.86  For
NVIC, these funds are collected through a seventy-five cent excise tax on every dose of
covered vaccine purchased.87
There are various ways the drug-injury compensation framework could be struc-
tured. Two basic features are critical, however, if the framework is to be effective in
promoting clinical compliance and safety-related investments.
1. Definition of Covered Parties
The covered parties need to be entities that can exert direct and meaningful control
over drug-related risks. These parties would purchase coverage and pay premiums into
the insurance system, in return for which they would be exempt from ordinary tort liability
for drug-related injuries. There could be several categories of covered parties: drug manu-
facturers; physicians and other healthcare providers; hospitals; clinical laboratories that
provide screening tests used in drug targeting; pharmacists and distributors; and even
health insurers, to the extent their formulary decisions affect the availability of drugs that
will be safe for given patient subpopulations. Naturally, the difficulty of designing an
insurance framework increases, as more categories are included. There may be advan-
tages to limiting the categories of coverage offered initially, and then expanding coverage
to others at a later time.
At a minimum, the insurance framework would need to cover drug manufacturers and
physicians. Without the participation of these two groups, crucial aspects of drug
safety could not be addressed through the insurance framework, because the entities
best able to control product safety, marketing, and prescribing practices would not be
involved. While drug-injury suits against pharmacists, hospitals, and other players do
occur, the major categories of drug-injury litigation are suits against manufacturers and
physicians. If the insurance framework is to provide a meaningful alternative to the tort
system, both physicians and manufacturers need to be covered from the outset.
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2. Method of Determining Insurance Premiums
It would reduce incentives to improve drug safety, if manufacturers whose products
rarely produce any injuries were required to pay the same insurance premiums as manu-
facturers of higher-risk products, or if physicians who strive to comply with safety
warnings were forced to pay the same premiums as physicians who follow high-risk
prescribing practices. Similar incentive problems have caused concern with the Swedish
no-fault medical-injury compensation system and with birth-related neurological injury
compensation programs adopted in Virginia and Florida in the 1980s.88
To create strong incentives for clinical compliance, the proposed drug-injury insur-
ance system would need to reward safe products and safe prescribing practices with
lower premiums. Rather than pooling risks broadly across covered parties, premiums
should be experience-rated (i.e., based on prior safety performance as reflected in actual
patterns of claims for injuries) and should take account of current factors that bear on
future risks (e.g., evidence that investments are being made to resolve safety problems).
Covered parties would pay different premiums, depending on how risky each party’s
particular products and practices actually are—a judgment that would be based on
various factors. In the case of manufacturers, these factors might include the risk pro-
files of the manufacturer’s product offerings, compliance with FDA’s good manufactur-
ing practices, and programs the manufacturer has put in place to educate physicians on
safe prescribing and patient-monitoring practices. Postmarket studies could be required
as a condition for insuring drugs with suspected safety issues, or such studies could be
encouraged by offering reductions in premiums upon completion of a study. In the case
of physicians, premiums might be based on actual prescribing patterns, adherence to
safety standards reflected in FDA-approved labeling, documented use of follow-up
testing to detect and mitigate adverse drug reactions, and actual clinical outcomes.
Basing insurance premiums on experience and risk factors has the effect of integrat-
ing a process of postapproval standard setting into the insurance framework. This
process identifies factors that affect clinical safety, harnesses clinical and other data to
measure safety performance, and appraises the likely effectiveness of incremental safety
measures. Insurance costs reflect each party’s measured performance against a set of
postapproval safety standards developed during the premium-setting process.
The insurance framework could be implemented state-by-state or through federal
legislation that preempts state tort remedies for drug-related injuries and authorizes the
creation of an insurance-based framework. Centralized administration could be problem-
atic, given the size of the U.S. healthcare system. An insurance framework offers oppor-
tunities to achieve varying degrees of decentralization, depending on how the frame-
work is designed. As with the workers’ compensation system, insurance programs could
be administered by states themselves or by private insurers, and states would be free to
fashion different solutions in line with their own insurance and medical practice regula-
tions. Coordination could be achieved by allowing state variation within an overall
framework of national guidelines and objectives. Because of its privatization potential,
the system would not necessarily require formation of immense new governmental
agencies to enforce clinical safety and administer payments into and out of the system.
A system based on the above design principles offers promise in addressing the two
key barriers to selective risk management.
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a. Promoting Clinical Compliance Through an
Insurance Framework
An insurance framework, properly designed, can promote clinical compliance while
preserving needed flexibility. Physicians still would have discretion to disregard infor-
mation contained in drug labeling, in situations where a physician deems this to be in
the patient’s best interest. By analogy, car insurance policies do not limit a driver’s
discretion to exceed the speed limit, nor do speeders necessarily suffer rate increases,
so long as the drivers speed with sound judgment and manage to avoid accidents and
police citations. In the same way, an insurance-based framework does not impose stark
rules that interfere with the practice of medicine, nor would physicians automatically
face rate increases for disregarding safety warnings, so long as their actual outcomes
data show sound clinical judgment was applied in the decisionmaking process.
Safety provisions of drug labeling are enforced implicitly, but not rigidly, under an
insurance-based framework. Consistent disregard of safety warnings would tend to
result in higher premiums or loss of coverage, yet manufacturers and physicians still
would have the flexibility to devise individual strategies for managing drug-related risks
and could tailor these strategies to their specific products and patients.
b. Creating Investment Incentives and Spreading the Costs
of Improved Safety
An insurance framework allows desired behaviors to be rewarded through reduc-
tions in premiums, thus creating timely, direct incentives to invest in safety improve-
ments. For example, manufacturers could be encouraged to provide safety education for
physicians, and physicians could be encouraged to attend such programs, by offering
lower insurance premiums upon completion of the training. More generally, when premi-
ums are experience-rated, manufacturers and physicians have a direct incentive to im-
prove clinical safety. This is in contrast to incentives created under the tort system,
which provides only a weak correlation between actions and consequences.89  Invest-
ing in safety improvements may or may not translate into reduced tort claims. An insur-
ance framework, on the other hand, can be structured to provide a dependable expecta-
tion that reducing the rate of injuries will translate into lower premiums.
Insurance frameworks have the attractive feature of being able to spread the costs of
drug safety and mobilize funds for investment in safety projects. Even if the insurance
framework initially limits its focus to manufacturers and physicians, there are sound
reasons to aim for more inclusive coverage eventually. As additional covered parties
(e.g., hospitals, pharmacists, and clinical laboratories) are brought into the insurance
framework, additional premiums would be paid into the system and wider cost-spread-
ing would be achieved. A portion of these premiums then could be set aside to invest in
projects that offer general safety benefits, such as work to promote interoperability of
clinical information systems, basic research into genetic and other causes of adverse
drug reactions, and clinical safety efforts by AHRQ and CERTs. This financing mecha-
nism could help overcome the free-rider problem and achieve fair cost sharing in projects
that provide common benefits.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are serious, fundamental problems with the current legal framework for drug
safety in the United States, and minor edits will not fix these problems. Designing a
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drug-injury compensation framework would be a major undertaking and would require
careful study and deliberation over a period of years. It is premature to propose that an
insurance-based framework be implemented now; however, the idea is ripe for intense
and systematic study.
Safe use of drugs in clinical practice requires nuanced, proactive management of risk
and an ongoing, dynamic regulatory process that extends past the initial marketing
approval as a matter of course, rather than in response to drug safety scandals. The
current U.S. framework for drug safety regulation is binary, reactive, and incomplete,
because it lacks the tools to keep beneficial drugs available while selectively managing
their risks. The necessary tools include an improved framework for clinical compliance,
an adaptive standard-setting process for clinical drug safety, and mechanisms to pro-
mote investment in safety-related projects. An insurance-based framework offers prom-
ise as a way to address longstanding problems in these areas.
Properly designed, an insurance-based framework could promote active manage-
ment of drug safety risks to which patients are exposed, while preserving the benefits
that prescription drugs offer to many patients. An insurance-based framework could
help free the U.S. system from historical constraints that thwart effective risk manage-
ment and would anticipate the science of increasing individualization of therapy in the
twenty-first century.

